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Abstract: The thesis of the article is that, following Stanley Cavell, within the
framework of Western culture, the cinematic comedy again and again can be seen
as an aesthetic form where passions for democracy take their way. Cavell defines,
first, philosophy as a matter of the ‘human voice’ which is, in reference to Kant’s
third Critique, a ‘universal voice’. An aesthetic judgement insofar is a model of
philosophical judgement. But beyond this, secondly, it is also a model of demo-
cratic judgement. For Kant, arguing about aesthetic matters means facilitating the
communitarisation of confrontation. ‘Common sense’ (sensus communis) is the po-
litical term Kant offers for this. Since this term, thirdly, has recently again been
appropriated by populist semantics, it is important to stress a radically democratic
meaning, with Cavell: a romantic conception of democracy, and to this conception,
fourth, the art form of comedy corresponds. Comedy and democracy both centre
around ‘the common, the familiar, the low’, and in laughter give this human-social
sphere both an anarchic-democratic level of meaning and a certain, humorous self-
reflection. The movie Adam’s Rib finally works as an example for this.
To say that philosophy is fundamentally dismissive of the ordinary is surely
a cliché. Even Socrates, that ancient founder of Western philosophy, fa-
mously involved ordinary people in conversations about everyday topics in
order to draw additional theoretical conclusions, especially with regard to
practical ethics. The most conspicuous examples of this in the Modern Age
are David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche and John Dewey. However, no philo-
sophical tradition has taken the ordinary so seriously and spelled out its
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significance in so many different variations as that in which Stanley Cavell
emphatically includes himself: namely the tradition of the later Wittgenstein,
as well as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, somewhat con-
fusingly known as ‘American transcendentalism’. The innovation of ordinary
language philosophy presented by Wittgenstein consists in its precise analysis
of linguistic expressions using colloquial means in order to cure philosophy of
its old metaphysical and new scientific, that is logical-positivistic fixations.
This theoretical-therapeutic strategy is easy to link to the declared goal of
US-American transcendentalism, famously summarised by Emerson as fol-
lows: ‘I embrace the common, I explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the
low.’1 Cavell also sits joyfully at the feet of the familiar, indeed he sometimes
celebrates an embracing of the common, the simple, the ordinary in words no
less emphatic than those Emerson chose in the romantic spirit of the early
19th century. To this extent he delivers a perfect US-American variant of
Romanticism. Which culture, if not the US-American culture, should be bet-
ter destined to declare the ordinary extraordinary, and vice versa, with all its
concomitant ambivalences? In this cultural context, Cavell has no hesitation
in including cinema, which he vehemently propounds without any European
arrogance to be the appropriate art form for the masses in the 20th century.
He undoubtedly deserves to be the honorary representative of ordinary film
philosophy. Cavell also lends this context a political-philosophical and espe-
cially democracy-theoretical accent, albeit allusively and indirectly. Readers
of Cavell’s works need to work out for themselves that for him film, espe-
cially comedy, represents a vision of militant democracy. The link between
film, comedy, democratic forms of life and romantic becoming ordinary of the
non-ordinary accordingly first has to be clarified through discourse. This is
what I should like to attempt in the following. My thesis, thus, is that within
the framework of Western culture, the cinematic comedy – that romantic fu-
sion of the ordinary and the extraordinary, renewed in popular culture – again
and again can be seen as an aesthetic form where passions for democracy take
their way.
I. CAVELL’S VOICES
Drawing upon his honoured teacher John Austin, and with a deliberate, crit-
ical stance towards the philosophy of Jacques Derrida, Cavell defines the
essence of his philosophy as ‘a matter of reinserting or replacing the human
voice in philosophical thinking.’2 That is a surprising and therefore for Cavell
a typical statement. The voice is not, namely, a fundamental philosophical
concept. In the relevant lexica it is rarely listed as an official term. And yet,
if we remember Derrida’s now somewhat faded theory, it is key to philosophy
that it views itself as being subject to massive criticism of so-called logocen-
trism. Cavell is reticent with regard to this major theory. He agrees, on the
one hand, that performative expressions can ‘be seen as an attack on what
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deconstruction attacks under the name logocentrism’, but on the other hand
he regards deconstructivism as a ‘flight from the ordinary’.3
Cavell raises in philosophy, however, not only the human voice of everyday
language, but also that of the self. Accordingly, the text genres of philosophy
include not only ordinary language philosophy, but also autobiography. Here
Cavell can appeal to some famous references, and he has presented some of
his own deliberations under the title A Pitch of Philosophy. Autobiographical
Exercises.4
The term ‘voice’ refers not only to the spoken language of the everyday
world and individual language use, but also, thirdly, to the field of politics,
at least in German. In German, the word for ‘vote’ is identical to that for
voice (Stimme) and here functions as a democratic-political metaphor found
in words such as Stimmrecht (voting rights), Stimmzettel (ballot slip), Ab-
stimmung (ballot), etc. and meaning the individual ‘right to speak’ or to
voice one’s opinion.5 In this context Cavell also allows himself to be led by
the romantic emphasis on individualism.6 The democratic-political seman-
tics of the voice (Stimme) have an accent for Cavell which is individualistic
in a radicalised and even intermittently anarchistic way, placing it within the
American romantic tradition of civil disobedience.
Finally, in addition to its colloquial, individualistic and political mean-
ings, the concept of the voice also has a universal connotation for Cavell.
When Cavell characterises philosophy as the claim ‘to speak for the human’,
he moves within the classical tradition of philosophical understanding. His
variation begins when he describes this claim to universality as a ‘univer-
salising use of the voice’ and additionally recognises the ‘arrogance’ which
can be found within this claim, namely ‘the arrogant assumption of the right
to speak for others’.7 In its inevitability, this arrogance is immanent in the
philosophical use of the substantivistic pronoun ‘I’, which means that it is
legitimate despite the seemingly illegitimate gesture. One justification for
this can be found in the concept of the exemplary. That which expresses
itself in the first person of the autobiography is ‘representative’; ‘each life (is)
exemplary of all’; herein also lies a ‘commonness’ of humanity.8
Cavell bases his deliberations, albeit seldom explicitly, on Kant’s Critique
of Judgement.9 Here he finds not only the significance of the exemplary, but
also preformulated the metaphor that guides it. According to Kant, if we call
an object beautiful ‘we believe ourselves to be speaking with a universal voice’
and that means, again according to Kant, that with an aesthetic judgement
one ‘lays claim’ to the ‘agreement of everyone’.10 It is this paradoxical struc-
ture of a ‘subjective universality’ which Cavell transfers to the philosophical
form of substantiation. What is only true of aesthetic judgements in tran-
scendental philosophy, is also true of philosophical judgements in the sense of
Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy. For a philosopher who says that ‘we’
use terms such as beautiful, game or meaning in a certain way, is also saying
that all people who understand these terms (correctly) are compelled to use
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them in the same way. And for this kind of compulsion he has no evidence
other than that exemplary evidence underlined by Kant to provide validity
for his taste judgement.
To this extent, an aesthetic judgement is a model of philosophical judge-
ment. Beyond this it is also a model of democratic judgement, and I would
now like to briefly provide evidence for this in a second step.
II. THE KANTIAN QUESTION OF WHY WE HAVE TO
QUARREL ABOUT MATTERS OF AESTHETICS
The desire to interpret Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgement politically, or
rather with a political accentuation, is as old as the theory itself. Three
well-known such proposals for interpretation have become established. In
the historical context of the French Revolution, Friedrich Schiller is the first
to use the contrasting capacities of cognition (imagination and reason) in
a daring political analogy to also see therein the contrasting social classes.
Hannah Arendt, on the other hand, emphasises the enabling powers of aes-
thetic judgement to put oneself in the place of others; she accentuates the
aesthetic capability of the imaginary, indeed the ideal of role playing; here
aesthetic judgement is a form of empathy, the understanding of an intellec-
tual sentiment. Finally, Jacques Rancière follows on from Schiller in terms
of sociopolitical radicalisation when he describes the contrast between the
two cognitive capacities or classes as that between exclusion and inclusion,
between those who determine what is politically viable and those who are
excluded from this process.11
I would like to add a fourth proposal to this list of interpretations. For
politics as a model, especially democratic politics, the aesthetic is well suited
because it commendably evens out the tension between communality and dis-
cord, trains the as-if perspective and ultimately facilitates a (presentative,
compensative and transformative) communication of sentiments. In the fol-
lowing, I shall refrain from speaking about the last two for reasons of time and
space. I should merely like to concentrate for a while on the first point named,
that is the relationship between communality and discord. My theory here
is: arguing about aesthetic matters means facilitating the communitarisation
of confrontation.
As we know, Kant analyses the argumentative logic behind the aesthetic
judgement as a specific relationship between the faculties of the imagination
(as a form of sensation) and understanding (Verstand) or reason (Vernunft)
in general. One has to emphasise that these faculties are strictly oppositional.
The one does precisely what the other does not want. As Kant puts it in §50
of his Critique of Judgement: Imagination stands for ‘lawless freedom’, but
reason ‘is the power of judgement’. The one, taken alone, ‘produces nothing
but nonsense’, the other is the faculty ‘consonant with understanding’.12 It
seems that the contradiction can only be solved in one direction or the other:
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either imagination in its unbridled freedom produces forms which overtax the
power of judgement, or reason limits the imagination. In the case of an aes-
thetic object (of nature, art, the everyday), however, what happens is neither
a subordination nor a mere (static) contradiction, but a (dynamic) recipro-
cal stimulation and potentiation of these oppositional elements. This is what
Kant meant by ‘play’.13 And since this play takes place between our ‘cogni-
tive powers’, i.e. between elements of experience which are fundamental to
human recognition, it is possible to speak of the aesthetic as if it were a cog-
nitively substantiated fact. In this way Kant can also impart the conciliatory
suggestion that one may not be able to ‘dispute’, to decide objectively about
taste, but that one can ‘quarrel’ about it, and for him that means: one can
attempt to battle out a consensus.14 In an aesthetic judgement we maintain
something which we cannot prove, but in a manner as if we were able to prove
it. For that which we maintain entails a legitimately felt claim to generalis-
able validity, a claim which is based on a feeling which is not merely private,
in other words subjectively valid, but also generally valid because it grows
from the interplay, the endless and passionate interaction of different, even
opposing elements of knowing and experiencing which in addition manifests a
reference to the dimensions of discourse called (explicit) knowledge, morality
and politics.15 Expressed in somewhat old-fashioned political language, we
cultivate in aesthetic experiences ‘a certain liberality in our way of thinking’.
Kant understands this as ‘independence of the liking from mere enjoyment of
sense’.16 But it is obvious that here he is also pointing out the significance of
freedom from prejudice, preference and freedom of mind in a further sense.
Aesthetic liberality is a successful balance between accord and discord. It is
the passionate and endless attempt to battle out a consensus, in other words
the fight among wilful or querulant individuals for community.
III. DEMOCRATIC COMMON SENSE
The general voice by which Cavell allows himself to be led is what Kant promi-
nently calls common sense (Gemeinsinn), only to immediately distinguish it
from the ordinary, political-ethical sense, that so-called healthy common sense
(sens commun, gesunder Menschenverstand) of the Enlightenment. It is one
of the peculiarities of the history of philosophical terms that the ‘history of
decay’ of common sense as a term begins when its conceptual clarification
reaches its climax through – nota bene – restriction to the aesthetic field pur-
sued by Kant.17 This is not true for the history of the term in its political
meaning, however. Whereas we can ascertain that the 18th century stands
out as the heyday of the term common sense, the 20th century after the Sec-
ond World War sees its revival in the services of representative democracy.18
The various stages of this history are quickly told.
Following on from the epistemological meaning proposed by Aristotle un-
der the term koine aisthesis, an authority intended to coordinate the impres-
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sions of the five human senses, during Roman Stoicism the term acquires a
politico-social and cultural meaning. Here, for the first time, it means those
values and convictions which are usually shared unspoken within a commu-
nity. At the beginning of the 18th century, following the Glorious Revolution,
a definition is then brought into circulation in England and France. Shaftes-
bury (1709), Giambattista Vico (1725) and Thomas Reid (1764) are the lead-
ing theorists here. In his famous essay from 1776, Thomas Paine puts common
sense into the US American context for the first time. Common sense is to
provide an answer to the question which will continue to occupy theorists of
modern society, namely ‘how to hold a heterogeneous society together with
a minimum of force’.19 The French Revolution refutes the relevance of the
term, the key concepts now being reason, freedom, truth and nation. Robe-
spierre and his revolutionary allies are all too painfully aware of the fact that
the people, in whose name they are conducting the Revolution, are hindered
by ignorance (not to say stupidity) and superstition. Napoleon then finally
succeeds in linking the revolutionary impulse with the counter-revolutionary
impulse in order to mobilise the so-called people and successfully perpetrate
a policy of disempowering those same people. The French Revolution, as we
are aware today, for the first time stirs up that populist criticism of democ-
racy which is later to have a mass impact in the totalitarian states of the 20th
century.20
Populism is a buzzword which also in our times agitates the political
spirits. In the political sciences, discussion of the semantics of this word has
only just begun, and yet the link to an anti-elitist and anti-democratic element
already seems at least plausible: in socio-critical terms, populism campaigns
against ‘the Establishment’, those ‘elites’ of politicians, media representatives,
intellectuals and managers who pull the wool over the eyes of the good hard-
working taxpaying people; populism is anti-democratic to the extent that it
unhinges pluralism, on which not only representative democracy is counting,
following on from the fact that the people is in a constant battle with itself
as a result of the division of powers, that it is not ‘one’ with itself.21 In the
context of common sense, we should be aware that this term is not protected
from appropriation by populist semantics. And not least because it, like our
own theory of communitarianism, emerged from a tension with the idea of
the liberal constitutional state and the principles of reason and autonomy;
common sense represents the other, more collective side of the democratic
coin. But that means that it, like the populism monopolising it politically, is
both one of the columns of democracy and one of its permanent threats. The
marriage between democracy and populism in the concept of common sense
is inevitably a ‘slippery subject’.22
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IV. COMEDY AND DEMOCRACY
When I underline the relationship between common sense, quarrel and democ-
racy, I indicate that I tend towards a conception of democracy which in more
recent discussion has become known as an ‘agonal’ or – with less drama –
‘communicative-associative’ democracy.23 Within this framework democracy
is concerned with the conflict between groupings who wish to assert their own
convictions of a collectively correct life. Confrontational distinctions between
‘us’ and ‘them’ are here constitutive, but they do not harden to become a
confrontation similar to that of civil war. Carl Schmitt’s notorious antago-
nism is here mitigated or transformed to become agonism. The basic political
distinction between ‘friend’ and ‘foe’ is relaxed as the Other enters the ring
as a mere ‘opponent’. The political and moral basic principle of respect for
the other holds true here, also and especially because the other advocates
principles and convictions which are incompatible with one’s own.
Schmitt’s political philosophy, as is well known, stems from his vehement
criticism of Romanticism, which he comprehends, as is usual since Hegel and
Goethe, as the hubris of the world-creating subject, that is, as a flight from
the reality of the normal world.24 Cavell turns this criticism on its head.
More precisely, he offers a secularly dialectic and humanistic interpretation
according to which Romanticism is both a wish for the extraordinary and for
the ordinary, climaxing in seeing the ordinary as something extraordinary.
It is not a case of seeing the extraordinary as something ordinary, and thus
removing what makes it special, but on the contrary of seeing the ordinary
as something extraordinary.25 If Romanticism therefore means a new under-
standing of the subjective, a reinterpretation of the everyday world, as it is
driven ever onwards by the individual powers of imagination in order thus to
express one’s own subjectivity, then this expressivism has the political im-
plication elevated by the United States to rank as Constitutional: namely,
the right of every individual to realise his or her own idea of a good life: the
pursuit of happiness.26 This is Cavell’s Romantic concept of democracy. It
means not only liberalistic self-determination, but within this same frame-
work also individual self-realisation. In the sense of Isaiah Berlin, democracy
means not only ‘negative’, but also ‘positive’ freedom, not only the freedom
of citizens from state coercion, but also realisation of one’s own goals. It is
Romantic because it places a significantly expressivistic accent on positive
freedom.
Now the final question is whether there is an art form which most closely
corresponds to this democracy. Cavell’s philosophical emphasis on the voice
steers our answer towards three art forms: music (predominantly opera), the-
atre and finally film, that technological or, more precisely, technical-dynamic
synthesis of music and theatre (whereas opera constitutes the artificial syn-
thesis). But Cavell does not nobilise film in his theory of democracy by
examining it media-essentialistically or ontologically for certain production
techniques (such as montage) or methods of reception (such as experiencing
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something as shocking, or noting something with distraction) in the manner
attempted by Walter Benjamin in the 1930s. Rather, he limits his interest in
this regard to certain genres, namely melodrama and comedy. In sociopolit-
ical terms, melodrama deals with the bitter drama of failing female emanci-
pation in bourgeois civilisation, whereas comedy deals with the battle of the
sexes.27
At this juncture it would normally be necessary to include a detailed
discussion of whether, and if so how, comedy displays a stronger affinity to
democracy than tragedy or its diminutive bourgeois form, the melodrama.
Instead, I shall limit myself to some supporting comments. They all point to
the argument which Cavell embraces, with Emerson, namely that comedy and
democracy both (a) centre around ‘the common, the familiar, the low’ and in
laughter give this human-social sphere both (b) an anarchic-democratic level
of meaning and (c) a certain self-reflection. Let us have a closer look at this.
In its essence, this argument was formed as far back as Aristotle. As he
says in his Poetics, comedy brings people onto the stage who are in some re-
spects ‘worse than the average’, ‘beneath’ the level of the spectators, in other
words people who, on the one hand, are governed in their anthropological
weaknesses by the conditio humana and, on the other hand, belong socially
and politically to a lower, non-aristocratic class.28 The latter distinguishing
criterion is to retain its validity until the late 18th century but is completely
diffused in the 20th century. The Hollywood comedies of remarriage which
Cavell dedicates himself to are also evidence of this as these comedies al-
ways take place in the setting of an affluent, a kind of money-aristocratic
class. The anthropological attribution correspondingly moves further into fo-
cus. Where comedy is concerned with human, all-too-human weaknesses, or
in more neutral terms, characteristics, it is really concerned with our attitude
towards these characteristics, in other words with our culture and morality.
And the task of comedy is to expose these characteristics – from cultural and
social inadequacies to moral weaknesses – to laughter and ridicule. This can
occur in different ways, however, sometimes in very different ways. Two reac-
tions seem to be key: derogatory and (re)cognisant, superior and conciliatory,
mocking and humorous laughter. But they are joined by two others: releas-
ing laughter and laughter reacting to the irreconcilable; relieving laughter and
laughter which expresses an incongruity. At least four types of ‘comical’ or
‘funny’ therefore need to be distinguished.29
The first is the most evident and theoretically the most common type,
summarised as the superiority theory. Accordingly, when we laugh we ex-
press superiority over the object of our laughter. The weaknesses which we
laugh at are those of others. It is a laughter which at least has a tendency
towards the aggressive, which politically is keenly functionalised by totalitar-
ian states, but that does not mean it does not also fulfil a useful function
in democracies. Here it depends on translating negative-aggressive (morally
humiliating) laughter to positive-aggressive laughter, similar to how in the
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course of civilisation and upbringing we learn to translate the psycho-physical
eruptive energy of aggression into rational thought and use it to lend our ar-
guments ‘bite’ and ‘sharpness’.30 Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes can be
named as relevant superiority theorists, but also Henri Bergson, according to
whom derision can be grasped as a warning by the community to those so-
called awkward individuals who do not manage to adapt in the expected social
way and who therefore stiffen ‘mechanically’ and make themselves ridiculous.
The best cineastic examples of this are Charlie Chaplin and Buster Keaton,
who demonstrate that laughing at others does not have to be utterly morally
superior, socially humiliating or politically exclusive. Bergson himself speaks
differentiatingly of a ‘momentary anaesthesia of the heart’.31 A (mere) mo-
ment of permitted moral-social coldness and political animosity is accordingly
a necessary element of laughing at comic and comedic figures.
The superiority theory covers probably the largest area of what makes peo-
ple laugh. But the incongruence theory is also important. Here, laughter is
a physical reaction to semantic ambivalences and logical nonsense, the unex-
pected, and involves a sudden dissolution of an expectation, a game of surprise
with conventions. Kant, Søren Kierkegaard and Arthur Schopenhauer rep-
resent this theory, but also Helmuth Plessner with his famous philosophical-
anthropological distinction between ‘bodily experience’ (Leib sein, literally
translated: ‘being a body’) and ‘experiencing one’s body’ (Körper haben, lit-
erally translated: ‘having a body’), which he links to the anthropological
phenomena of laughing and crying. Laughing, like crying, is a physical reac-
tion in the face of a situation to which we cannot react with speech. Instead,
we seek out a different level of meaning where ‘bodily experience’ plays a ma-
jor role. For the art form of theatre (but also film) this physicality has two
consequences, as stressed by Bernhard Greiner. Firstly, it is constitutive of
theatre that it ‘always simultaneously presents the movement of messages, for
which the body is the instrument of “expression”, and the movement of bod-
ies, which are the actors’. Linguistic and performative meaning are equally
relevant. Particularly for the genres of comedy and tragedy, however, the
consequence is that they each place different emphases on these double lev-
els of meaning: whereas tragedy strengthens the importance of ‘expression’,
comedy refuses to make the same hierarchisation, instead emphasising not the
words, but the physical-performative happenings on the stage.32 Comedy, we
can then say, is democratic-horizontal and anarchic (not: anarchistic) in its
semantic structure.33 It performatively undermines the meanings it itself has
offered, takes back in the course of the events what it itself has previously
presented.
Thirdly, the compensation theory claims to be comprehensive, but remains
completely within an abstract-mechanical economy of the physical and the
emotions. This theory was first developed by Herbert Spencer in the 19th
century, who explained laughter in its physical process as a liberating release
of accumulated nervous energy, and became famous with Freud and his work
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on Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious (1905). According to Freud,
the desire for wit, comedy and humour is drawn from a source which has
become increasingly obstructed since earliest childhood, an obstruction we
can only escape momentarily through laughter. Accordingly, laughter permits
momentary satisfaction of a (particularly sexual and aggressive) drive which
moral and legal standards prohibit us from acting upon.
The later Freud is to write a text suited to the fourth theory of laughter
and the comic, the reconciliation or more precisely humour theory. His short
essay Humour (1927) is no longer based on the mechanic-hydraulic explana-
tory model, but on Freud’s so-called structural or three-agent model of the
psyche, with its now famous distinction between id, ego and superego. The
surprising line of argumentation which Freud takes in this context consists
in allowing the superego, that abstract agent of valid norms, to be not puni-
tive and hostile, but liberating, inspiring, loving and comforting. To quote a
funny pun from Simon Critchley: ‘this superego is your amigo’.34 Whereas
in superiority we laugh at others by seeing them as children and ourselves
as adults, in humour we laugh at ourselves. The adult once again accepts
themselves as a child, and for the human species that means accepting itself
in its infancy. In humorous laughter we adopt an amicable attitude towards
our human limitations or conditio humana.
In the context of the discussion about a common sense demanded by
democracy, Freud’s later theory acquires an additional meaning. When we
laugh at ourselves, we laugh not only at ourselves as individuals and part
of humanity, but also as part of a social group. Humour and brilliant wit,
following Shaftesbury’s observation, are a form of the sensus communis. They
reveal a deep layer of our shared cultural (moral, social, political) values.
Thus ‘the Bavarians’ laugh at ‘the Prussians’ and vice versa, ‘the Germans’
laugh at ‘the East Frisians’ or maybe at ‘the French’ and vice versa, and thus
they all laugh imagining themselves as part of a small, yet unconquerable
community. For example, somewhere in Brittany they might laugh at ‘the
Romans’ as a symbol of imperialism, etc. But this superior laughing of one
community of shared values at another also involves an additional, albeit
often subtle, opposing element. In laughing in this way, we assure ourselves
of that which we have in common, not only by placing ourselves in opposition
to another group – the first and most common type – but also by distancing
ourselves from our own group, albeit only maybe momentarily – and this is the
second type. This type avails itself of the incongruence method in particular,
the second of the models introduced above. Every unexpected turn in a joke or
comic situation is also a turn against the sensus communis. We can therefore
say that laughter at jokes and comic situations also indicates a dissensus
communis.35 Laughter reveals structures in one’s view of the world because
it not only invites one to identify blindly with some, but also to distance
oneself from others. The latter is a weaker option, to be sure, but it enables
the line of argumentation which Kant set out in his Critique of Judgement to
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be taken up once more: the more laughter at the comic distances itself from
a concrete community, the more an ideal community shines through.
The affinity of democracy for comedy and, more broadly, for the comic
therefore – firstly – consists in focussing on what, in a socio-cultural and an-
thropological sense, is ordinary: the calamities (embarrassments and unfor-
tunate mishaps) of human beings, whether as members of a certain group or
as members of the species. Comedy is happy to leave extraordinary heroism,
sublime idealism, devastating suffering, all-pervading pathos, entanglement
in compelling contradictions, death in the name of a higher cause, acknowl-
edgement of a fateful and stronger power, to tragedy. Of course, tragic con-
flicts are also undeniably constitutive of democracy, conflicts resulting from
equally justified claims which are therefore irreconcilable. This is precisely
what makes democracy agonal. But these are not conflicts which culminate
in life or death, at least not in usual circumstances falling short of revolu-
tion and civil war. The dramas of polemic democracy are different, milder.
The affinity of democracy for comedy – secondly – consists in cultivating an
anarchic-democratic semantics which not only refuses to accept a higher in-
stance, but which ultimately refuses to accept an instance at all. The comic
insofar is constitutively anti-dogmatic. And thirdly, the affinity of democracy
consists in giving laughter, in incongruence and humour, a self-reflective and
again anti-dogmatic twist. Human beings who can laugh at themselves are
at home in a democracy.
V. LAUGHING AT THE BATTLE OF THE SEXES
Let us, finally, cast a look at one of the Hollywood comedies which attracted
Cavell’s romantic-democratic attention.36 Adam’s Rib, directed by George
Cukor and first released in 1949, is one of those films known in Hollywood
as a sophisticated or romantic comedy. They are filled with dialogue and
fast action, in general line with comedy, which is not the place for silent and
inactive characters, however much these characters may seem comic or even
be comedians; the films of Aki Kaurismäki are worth watching in this con-
text. Slapstick comedies, especially silent films, headed by the unforgettable
Buster Keaton, focus on a very unique type of action based on the body and
facial expression, or more precisely on physical misfortune, an alien situa-
tion and a corresponding commentary by facial expression, which for Keaton
can be completely deadpan. Cavell’s comedies of remarriage, in contrast, are
closer to the type of conversational plays written by George B. Shaw or Oscar
Wilde, set in more elevated, that is wealthier and educated social circles, and
indulging us with brilliant conversation. Adam’s Rib is tellingly translated
into German as Ehekrieg (Marital Feud) because the film deals with the bat-
tle of the sexes fought inside a marriage, a sociopolitical problem in which,
as always when real change is involved, one side must fight hard for what the
other has long had and refuses to share.
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Adam and Amanda Bonner, played by Spencer Tracy and Katharine Hep-
burn, a Hollywood dream team in the 1940s, are a happily married couple,
as we learn at the beginning of the film. Discussions immediately become
heated, however, whenever sexual equality rears its head as a bone of con-
tention. This happens also when a woman is accused of attempting to murder
her husband after she has caught him with another woman in flagranti. Des-
perately and clumsily (she first has to study the instructions), she waves a
revolver around and shoots, injuring her husband. As soon as she realises
what she has done, she immediately and comically remembers her role as
loving wife and attends to him in his plight. Amanda, a lawyer by profession,
assumes the defence of the wife, while Adam, a public prosecutor, takes up the
case for the prosecution. He loses the case because his wife and professional
adversary builds up a skilful line of defence based on the unequal perception
of the sexes. If it had not been a woman directing a weapon at her husband,
but a man directing one at his wife found with another man, he would not
be found guilty because a husband can appeal to the unwritten law whereby
he always has the right to defend his own home against intruders. Amanda
demands the same right for her client.
In ancient comic tradition, Adam, representing the male sex, is shown
up quite badly by his wife. She repeatedly proves herself as the verbally
dextrous lawyer. Once she even oversteps the verbal boundary and exposes
Adam to physical ridicule when she asks a witness, a former weightlifter, to
demonstrate her skills in the court room. Much to his amazement, the woman
lifts him up in the air, leaving him to gesticulate wildly and awkwardly like a
little boy. In private the couple also cross the aggression boundary, not badly
or coarsely, but no longer lovingly. During a massage which they are both
obviously enjoying, she smacks him on his behind, then he does the same to
her more forcefully, until anger is written all over her face – and she is about
to have a fit of rage.
The curve of aggression reaches its peak when Adam, after his failure in
court, turns his successful wife’s legal argument around and uses it against
her. Knowing that a friend of theirs and presumptuous admirer of Amanda
is visiting her for the evening, he surprises them both with a drawn pistol.
This is clearly a re-enactment of the scene with the wronged wife that we
saw at the beginning of the film. But Adam is only pretending. The pistol
is made of liquorice, and he enjoys biting into it once he has achieved his
aim, namely that his shocked and frightened wife falls back on the position
that was precisely his own in court: that nobody has the right to break the
law by taking it into their own hands. After he has taught her this lesson,
an actual quarrel breaks out between the three people in the room involving
physical violence or at least physical involvement, a small physical explosion
of emotions which the film does not actually show. The film restricts itself to
the outcome: crumpled, furious, dishevelled figures.
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Adam’s rib thus brings two marriages to the courtroom, that of the ac-
cused and her unfaithful husband, and that of Adam and Amanda Bonner,
the prosecutor and his lawyer wife. In an exemplary culmination, we can also
say that it brings to the courtroom the very institution of marriage itself, or
rather the bourgeois form of marriage practised in America after the Second
World War; and that it does this in such an uproarious way that the pro-
ceedings sometimes seem like a Punch and Judy show.37 Marriage becomes
the object of pugnacious debate, and the cinema becomes an extended court
of law in which the audience, men and women, married or not (yet), are ulti-
mately called upon to pass judgement on themselves. Not in legal earnest, but
laughing: sometimes superior and mocking, pointing a negative-aggressive or
maybe a positive-aggressive finger at others, momentarily anaesthetising the
morally beating heart, sometimes in recognition and reconciliation, increasing
expectations and thwarting them, and always relieving and releasing.
Of course, in the film the couple ultimately manages to avert the threat
of divorce. Adam proudly tells his wife that the Republican party wishes to
propose him to hold the position of a Judge. His joyful expression changes,
however, sensing an impending blow, when Amanda with feigned innocence
asks him whether the Democrats have also proposed a candidate – and of
course she means a female candidate. The film thus has a happy ending –
otherwise it would not be a comedy – yet one which already hints at the next
conflict – otherwise it would not be a comedy for a combative democracy.
j.fruchtl@uva.nl
NOTES
1‘The American Scholar’, quoted in
Cavell 1981, 14.
2Cavell 1990, 63.
3Cavell 1994, 79, and, respectively 167.
4Augustine’s Confessions, those of
Rousseau (which he does not specify, how-
ever) and, finally, three testimonies from
the 19th century, namely Nietzsche’s Ecce
homo, Thoreau’s Walden and Mill’s work
The Subjection of Women. Mill wrote this
work with his wife, whom he also acknowl-
edges as having influenced his other books,
far removed from any patriarchal attitude
or vanity (cf. Cavell 1994, 16-17, 2, 39).
5Cavell 1994, 37, 69.
6Cf. Cavell 1994, 50; Emerson’s fa-
mous quotation in this context is: ‘Whoso
would be a man, must be a nonconformist’,
quoted in: Laugier 2015, 1048.
7Cavell 1994, vii-viii.
8Cavell 1994, 11.
9‘Kant’s “universal voice” is, with per-
haps a slight shift of accent, what we hear
recorded in the philosopher’s claims about
“what we say”’ (Cavell 1976, 94).
10Kant 1987, 59-60 (§8), cf. 56 (§7), 86
(§19).
11Cf. Rancière 2002.
12Kant 1987, 188 (§50).
13Cf. here also Henrich 1992, 51-52.
14Kant 1987, 210 (§56).
15Privacy of feeling means their claim
to validity, not their constitutability. The
idea that even the seemingly most pri-
vate of emotions are socially constituted
and thus not private can be convincingly
substantiated with theories such as those
by the late Wittgenstein, Gadamer and
Davidson. An aesthetic statement which
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is private or subjectively valid is one such
as: ‘Barnett Newman’s “Who’s Afraid of
Red, Yellow and Blue?” – taking Version
III in the Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam
– ‘is a bad painting because I really am
afraid of red.’
16Kant 1987, 128.
17Cf. Maydell and Wiehl 1974, 244.
18Rosenfeld 2011, 244. On the history
of the term following in the text cf. in
turn Rosenfeld 2011, 22 (on Stoicism), 24
(Shaftesbury 1709), 59 (Vico 1725), 71
(Reid 1764), 136 (Paine 1776).
19Rosenfeld 2011, 24.
20Cf. Rosenfeld 2011, 182, 193, 194, 220.
21Cf. Müller 2016, 26, 55.
22Rosenfeld 2011, 6, 256.
23On the agonal, that means the prin-
cipally, but not existentially antagonis-
tic concept of the political, cf. Mouffe
2000; Mouffe 2005; with greater proxim-
ity to a deliberative concept of democracy:
Honig 1993; Tully 1995; Connolly 1999;
on the communicative-associative concept
of democracy cf. Benhabib 1992, Calhoun
1992, 73-98; Bickford 1996.
24Cf. Bohrer 1989, 138ff. (Hegel) &
284ff. (Schmitt).
25‘One can think of romanticism as the
discovery that the everyday is an excep-
tional achievement. Call it the achieve-
ment of the human’ Cavell 1979, 463. This
interpretation is fitting for the famous def-
inition by Novalis (from Aphorismen und
Fragmente 1798-1800): ‘Insofar as I imbue
the mundane with meaning, the ordinary
with mystery, the familiar with the seemli-
ness of the unfamiliar, and the finite with
the semblance of the infinite, I romanti-
cise it.’ - We should remember here that
Thomas Mann also once made a connec-
tion between Novalis and Walt Whitman,
between German Romanticism and Amer-
ican democracy; both sides needed each
other (cf. Lepenies 2006, 56).
26Romanticism then means the right of
each subject to determine the ‘circum-
stances’ under which this subject would
be content (Cavell 1979, 466); cf. Laugier
2015, 10-49.
27The most renowned directors here
are Douglas Sirk and Rainer Werner
Fassbinder. Beyond Cavell’s theorising,
there also exist masculine melodramas, of
course; East of Eden (1955, by Elia Kazan,
with James Dean) is one of the most fa-
mous, with Manchester By the Sea (2016,
by Kenneth Lonergan, starring Casey Af-
fleck) being a more recent example.
28Aristotle 1924, 1448a & 1449a 32.
29In the following I refer to Morreal
1987, who distinguishes three theories of
laughter: the superiority, incongruence
and compensation theories (the last of
which he prefers to call the relief or release
theory). Simon Critchley 2002 rightly
adds a fourth theory, the reconciliation or
humour theory. Bernhard Greiner 2006,
in contrast, taking up Hans Robert Jauß,
works only with two basic forms of the
comic, namely one superior looking down
and one inferior looking up, which leads
him to oversimplify the situation and at-
tribute to Kant, for example, the supe-
riority and not the incongruence theory,
to Hegel likewise generally the superiority
and not the reconciliation theory, and to
Nietzsche (or more precisely the Nietzsche
in The Gay Science) simply the basic in-
feriority form (cf. 2f., 92, 98).
30Cf. Hoggett 2002, 114.
31Cited in Critchley 2002, 87.
32Greiner 2006, 5; on the principle of
double levels of meaning as the principle
of theatre, Greiner refers to theorists such
as Umberto Eco and Erika Fischer-Lichte.
33On the difference between the anarchic
and the anarchistic – the anarchic protests
against all archè (rule, principle, origin)
and thus also against all hierarchies – cf.
Levinas 1992, 224 (Engl. transl. from
French, Otherwise Than Being, Or Beyond
Essence).
34Critchley 2002, 103.
35Critchley 2002, 18, 78, with refer-
ence, amongst others, to Alfred Schütz,
Strukturen der Lebenswelt (80) and to
Kant, sometimes explicitly (80), some-
times implicitly (90); Critchley ultimately
and rightly weakens the assumption of the
emancipatory and politically progressive
power of humour: ‘humour also indicates,
or maybe just adumbrates, . . . how things
might be otherwise’ (90).
36It goes without saying that the thesis
arguing for the affinity of democracy for
109
Sensus and Dissensus Communis.
comedy or the comical should be tested,
also, in the case of film on a number of
distinctive examples, from the slapstick of
Jerry Lee Lewis and Eddy Murphy via The
Life of Brian (1980), The Blues Broth-
ers (1980), A Fish Called Wanda (1989),
Men in Black (1997), The Big Lebowski
(1998), The Truman Show (1998), Ocean’s
Eleven (2002) up to the romantic comedies
of Moonstruck (1987), When Harry Met
Sally (1989), Sleepless in Seattle (1993),
Email For You (1998) and a contempo-
rary screwball-comedy like One Fine Day
(1996).
37Cf. Cavell 1981, 192, 194-5, 198.
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